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An Alternate Approach to Situs Determination for
Partnership Interests
Jack Spencer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that in 2021 a wealthy domiciliary of country Q dies leaving a large and varied estate. Neither the decedent nor his estate has any
ties to the U.S. except for an ownership interest in a partnership organized under New York state law. The partnership assets include a consulting firm with operations and offices in the U.S. and abroad. There is no
estate tax treaty between the U.S. and country Q. This article seeks to
answer two questions:
1) On what authorities would a U.S. court rely in determining
whether the partnership interest (PI)1 of this hypothetical
decedent, as a non-resident non-citizen (NRNC) of the
U.S., is U.S. situs?
2) In applying these authorities to the facts, what portion of
the decedent’s PI, if any, would a U.S. court deem to be
U.S. situs, and thus subject to U.S. estate tax?
There are four theoretical bases, generally speaking, for determining situs of PIs: 1) domicile of decedent at death, 2) partnership’s place of
organization, 3) location of business activities, and 4) physical location
of its underlying assets.2 For illustration purposes, applying each of
these situs theories to our hypothetical decedent yields the following
situs determinations: 1) Country Q situs – where the decedent was domiciled at death; 2) U.S. situs – partnership organized under New York
state law; 3) Split situs – partnership has operations in U.S. and abroad;
and 4) Split situs – partnership has business assets physically present in
the U.S. and abroad.
* Jack Spencer is an Associate in the Private Client Group at Dechert LLP where
his practice focuses on domestic and cross-border gift and estate planning. He received
his J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center. The views expressed in this article are
solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Dechert LLP.
1 Unless indicated otherwise, any reference in this article to partnership interests or
PIs is intended to mean the partnership interests of a non-resident non-citizen decedent.
2 See Michael Heimos, Non-Citizens – Estate, Gift and Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax, Detailed Analysis, 837-4th Ests., Gifts & Trs. Portfolios (BL) at IV.D (2021).
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Which situs theory applies has significant impact for our hypothetical decedent and for the Internal Revenue Service (the Service). Under
the first theory, the value of the partnership is excluded from the decedent’s gross estate entirely; under the second it is included entirely. For
the theories that yield a split situs result, the inevitable question of proportionality arises, that is, does any U.S. presence, no matter how small,
render the entire value of the decedent’s interest in the partnership includable in his gross estate, or is the extent of inclusion proportional to
the presence? And the stakes are high: NRNC estates, like those of U.S.
residents, are subject to an effective estate tax rate of 40%, but whereas
the 2021 exemption for U.S. residents stands at $11,700,000, adjusted for
inflation, the exemption for NRNCs is a mere $60,000.3
In answering the two questions posed above, this article begins with
a survey of the statutory, regulatory and judicial authorities that influence PI situs determination. The discussion then moves to an analysis of
the 1933 Supreme Court case of Burnet v. Brooks4 for two reasons: first,
to ground the discussion in the principles that initially authorized the
federal government to impose an estate tax on NRNC property; second,
to establish an analytical framework for determining the scope of U.S.
situs rules that can be applied to PIs. In applying this framework to PIs,
the focus shifts to international law, specifically to bilateral estate tax
treaties, and then more specifically, to those bilateral estate tax treaties
to which the U.S. is party. It will categorize the treatment of PIs under
the various treaty regimes and use the hypothetical decedent described
above as a test case in order to identify situs rule norms at international
law.
In conclusion, the article argues that a U.S. court tasked with determining the PI situs would be limited, per Brooks, by the situs norms at
international law, of which there are two: first, a partnership’s underlying assets are U.S. situs to the extent that those assets are part of a
“permanent establishment” physically located in the U.S., and then only
to the extent of the decedent’s interest in the partnership; second, PI
situs is the domicile country of the NRNC decedent. Although these two
situs rules conflict, together they establish the outer boundaries of what
Brooks would deem a viable situs rule. Therefore, until Congress addresses the issue of PI situs directly, Brooks mandates that a court faced
with facts similar to those of the hypothetical decedent above limit its
holding to one of the two situs rules enumerated above.

3 See Rev. Proc. 2020-45, 2020-46 I.R.B. 1016; see I.R.C. § 2102(b)(1). All citations
are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, unless otherwise stated.
4 288 U.S. 378 (1933).
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Congress must express its intention to tax in clear and unambiguous
language.5 Despite the fundamental role situs determination plays in
calculating one’s tax liability, Congress and the Service have neglected
to provide clear PI situs rules in the relevant statutes and regulations. As
for agency guidance, the Service has visited this topic on a single occasion, in the form of Rev. Rul. 55-701 of 1955;6 however this ruling is
widely regarded as fundamentally flawed and unreliable. Lastly, federal
case law provides no holdings that directly address PI situs determination, and the common law maxim of mobilia sequuntur persoman, which
functions as a backstop situs rule in the event of statutory and regulatory silence, has received such unfavorable treatment in federal case law
that reliance upon the maxim alone would be ill-advised. It is this dearth
of legal authority that necessitates an alternate approach to PI situs
rules, but before discussing the alternative, an in-depth analysis of these
authorities must proceed.
A. Statutes and Regulations
Section 2101 of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) imposes estate tax on the gross estate of every NRNC the world-over. Section 2103
narrows the NRNC gross estate to property “situated in the United
States” at the time of death. The sister statutes of sections 2104 and 2105
then define the scope of “in the United States” for different types of
property and property interests. The statutes provide clear situs rules for
certain property types, such as corporate stock, but they are silent on
PIs.
In 1958 the Service promulgated Treas. Regs. section 20.21041(a)(4) and section 20.2105-1(e) to refine the scope of “situated in the
United States,” and ever since commentators have debated whether PIs
fall within its provisions.7 Treas. Reg. section 20.2104-1(a)(4) states that
an NRNC’s gross estate includes: “intangible personal property the written evidence of which is not treated as being the property itself, if it is
issued by or enforceable against a resident of the United States or a
domestic corporation or governmental unit.”8
5

Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 578, 583 (1902).
Rev. Rul. 55-701, 1955-2 C.B. 836.
7 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2104-1(a)(4), 20.2105-1(e). The two provisions mirror one another: the former states that intangibles are within the U.S. if listed therein, the latter
states that intangibles are outside the U.S. if not listed therein. Each states that it is
subject to the other, and each lists the exact same property interests. For simplicity, this
article will only refer to Treas. Reg. § 20.2104-(a)(4) henceforth.
8 Treas. Reg. § 20.2104-1(a)(4).
6
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The analysis begins with whether PIs are “intangible personal property” because if not, Treas. Reg. section 20.2104-1(a)(4) is irrelevant.
Commentators largely agree,9 despite the Service’s reluctance to provide guidance on the issue,10 that PIs are intangibles. The authorities for
this proposition are scattered but consistent.11 Thus if the Code incorporates PIs into an NRNC’s gross estate, it must do so by way of Treas.
Reg. section 20.2104-1(a)(4). The analysis shifts to determining whether
PIs qualify as “issued by or enforceable against” a 1) “resident of the
United States” 2) “a domestic corporation” or 3) “governmental unit.”12
If none of the three applies, then the only conclusion is that the Code
and its regulations contain no PI situs rule.
Partnerships are not governmental units, and by definition they
cannot be corporations.13 Therefore if Treas. Reg. section 20.21041(a)(4) includes PIs, it must be because a partnership is a “resident of
the United States.” Prior to 2006, the strongest argument for the assertion that the term “resident” included partnerships relied on the nowrepealed language of Treas. Reg. section 301.7701-5 that defined “resident partnerships.”14 This position had its critics, with some asserting
that because the resident partnership provision of then Treas. Reg. section 301.7701-5 applied an engaged in trade or business test to determine residency, incorporating that definition, and thereby that test, into
Treas. Reg. section 20.2104-1(a)(4) would be an arbitrary and capricious
extension of that test into an area of law that had previously only adjudged situs based on place of organization (regarding corporate stock)
9 Richard A. Cassell et al., Special Reports, U.S. Estate Planning for Nonresident
Aliens Who Own Partnership Interests, 2003 TAX NOTES INT’L. 563, 572.
10 The IRS will not rule as to whether partnership interests are intangibles under
I.R.C. § 2501(a)(2), regarding NRNC transfers of intangibles for gift tax purposes. See
Rev. Proc. 2018-7, 2018-1 I.R.B. 271, 273 § 4.01(29)-(30). It is widely assumed that this
extends to estate tax considerations as well, as the estate tax and gift tax provisions are to
be read in pari materia. See, e.g., Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 311 (1945).
11 See Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928); see also PLR 7737063 (June 17,
1977) (stating that intangibles refer to “corporate stock, bonds, notes, bank deposits, patents, partnership interest, goodwill, etc.”); see also Rev. Rul. 55-701, 1955-2 C.B. 836
(referring to Blodgett in its attempt to resolve situs of partnerships).
12 Treas. Reg. § 20.2104-1(a)(4).
13 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2).
14 M. Annette Glod, United States Estate and Gift Taxation of Nonresident Aliens:
Troublesome Situs Issues, 51 TAX LAW. 109, 116-17 (1997); Patrick W. Martin, Why Section 2104 Must Address When Partnership Interests Owned by Foreign Investors Are (and
Are Not) Subject to United States Estate Tax, PROCOPIO 1, 7 (May 2004), https://
www.procopio.com/uploads/model/Block/4555/pdf/113/why-section-2104-must-addresswhen-partnership-interests-owned-by-foreign-investors-are-and-are-not-subject-tounited-states-estate-tax-918.pdf.
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and physical presence (regarding real and tangible property).15 However since the amendment to Treas. Reg. section 301.7701-5 in 2006, the
concept of residency as applied to partnerships is virtually non-existent
in the Code.16 In fact, the basis given for the amendment was that the
concept of residency as applied to partnerships had “become obsolete”
in the Code.17 Thus the argument that “resident” under Treas. Reg. section 20.2104-1(a)(4) includes partnerships no longer holds water.
The Code’s definition of “resident” is equally unhelpful, as, by its
own terms, it does not apply to subtitle B (Estate and Gift Taxes).18
Therefore the definition of “resident” as regards Treas. Reg. section
20.2104-1(a)(4) must come from within subtitle B itself. That definition
is found in Treas. Reg. section 20.0-1(b)(1), which provides that residence is determined by domicile. Domicile determination is heavily fact
dependent and hinges upon the actor’s intent. As partnerships and other
organizations cannot intend, the only conclusion available is that “resident” as used in Treas. Reg. section 20.2104-1(a)(4) cannot include partnerships. In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the Code and its
regulations are silent on the situs determinations of PIs, and guidance
must come from elsewhere.19
B. Agency Rulings
The only time the Service addressed the issue of PI situs was in
Rev. Rul. 55-701 of 1955.20 A wide variety of commentators concur that
Rev. Rul. 55-701 is no longer good law, if it ever was, because of its
potentially narrow scope and its misplaced reliance on unsupportive or
unpersuasive case law.21 Nonetheless, the ruling represents the Service’s
current position on the matter and deserves consideration.
15 Robert F. Hudson, Jr., The Tax Effects of Choice of Entities for Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate and U.S. Businesses, 4 BUS. ENTITIES, Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 16, 23.
16 Howard J. Barnet Jr., Special Report, Estate Tax Situs of Partnership Interests,
2014 TAX NOTES 1093, 1096 n.27.
17 T.D. 9153, 2004-2 C.B. 517.
18 I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1) (“In General — For purposes of this title (other than subtitle
B).”).
19 This conclusion is widely supported among commentators. See Martin, supra note
14, at 2-3; Cassell et al., supra note 9, at 570-71; Dina Kapur Sanna, Calling for Clarity on
NRAs’ Partnership Situs, TR. & EST., Nov. 2009, at 36, 37; Barnet Jr., supra note 16, at
1096; see also Heimos, supra note 2, at 3 (“The reason for this debate is simple: Advisors
and commentators have really been given no choice, as Congress is silent on the issue, the
rules in the regulations are incomplete or poorly written (and perhaps, as some commentators have surmised, are invalid), and the guidance from the IRS is flawed.”).
20 Rev. Rul. 55-701, 1955-2 C.B. 836.
21 See Stafford Smiley, Dispositions of U.S. Partnership Interests by Nonresident
Aliens, 8 J. P’SHIP TAX’N 133, 144 (1991); Glod, supra note 14, at 121; Barnet Jr., supra
note 16, at 1096.
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In Rev. Rul. 55-701, the Service was tasked with applying the situs
rules of a now-obsolete U.S.-U.K. estate tax convention to determine
the situs of PIs belonging to a U.K. domiciliary decedent. The provisions
of that now-obsolete tax convention required that when its situs rules
failed to mention the particular type of property at issue, the situs rules
of the non-domiciliary State would serve as the tiebreaker.22 Since the
decedent was a domiciliary of the U.K., and since the situs rules of the
treaty did not mention PIs, the treaty required that the Service apply
U.S. law to determine situs. The Service, finding no U.S. authority on
point, relied on a 1907 U.K. court decision in which an English subject
died owning shares in a sheepherding partnership based in Australia.23
Why the Service chose to rely on a wholly foreign court case, and why
the Service chose this particular case over other foreign cases, is unclear.24 Questionable authoritative basis aside, the Service concluded
that the situs of PIs is where the business is carried on.
Some commentators advance the additional argument that the
scope of Rev. Rul. 55-701 is confined to interpreting the obsolete U.S.U.K. treaty and should not be regarded as the Service’s position on PI
situs in general.25 The closing line of the ruling seems to qualify its
scope, stating, “In view of the foregoing, it is held that in the application
of the United States-United Kingdom Estate Tax Convention the situs of
a partnership interest is where the business is carried on.”26 Regardless
of the ruling’s scope, its fundamental flaw is its arbitrary reliance on a
single foreign case. In light of the fact that the Service has not revisited
the issue of PI situs, we turn now to federal case law.

22 Convention Respecting Double Taxation and Taxes on Estates of Deceased Persons, U.S.-U.K., Apr. 16, 1945, T.I.A.S. 1547. This treaty was terminated October 19,
1978. See infra note 68.
23 Comm’r of Stamp Duties v. Salting [1907] AC 449 (PC) (appeal taken from
NSW).
24 The Service’s reliance on a single foreign case has been a source of bemusement
for commentators. See Hudson Jr., supra note 15, at 30 n.34 (“[C]iting no U.S. authorities
but rather a U.K. case!”); Heimos, supra note 2, at 4 (“So in formulating its (apparently
final) position on the subject, the IRS relied solely upon an interpretation of the New
South Wales death duty as it applied to a partnership of Australian sheep farmers. That
this ruling can be criticized as having a weak foundation is obvious. There was no reliance
on any American authority for the final position.”).
25 See Cassell et al., supra note 9, at 573 (“[T]his ruling was based on an interpretation of a former estate and gift tax treaty, rather than providing guidance as to the domestic estate tax rules.”).
26 Rev. Rul. 55-701, 1955-2 C.B. 836 (emphasis added).
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C. Federal Case Law
Unfortunately, the guidance federal case law provides is similarly
scant. It is well documented that Blodgett v. Silberman,27 to which Rev.
Rul. 55-701 erroneously cites, is not on point for determining PI situs.28
While acknowledging that Blodgett is not on point, some commentators
have attempted to mill this case for a different type of grain, specifically
as support for the proposition that the common law doctrine of mobilia
sequuntur personam should control PI situs determination.29 That doctrine holds that in lieu of a statute to the contrary, it is the domicile of
the decedent that determines situs of personal property, including intangibles.30 The statutes are undoubtedly silent on PI situs, and therefore, the argument goes, until that silence is filled, mobilia sequuntur
personam controls. The Achilles heel of this argument is the checkered
past of the doctrine itself. The Supreme Court has frequently dismissed
the doctrine as “a fiction at most,”31 and according to one commentator,
no U.S. court has ever applied it in situs determination.32 So although its
mechanical logic may be tempting, the argument in favor of mobilia sequuntur personam is only as sound as the courts’ past treatment of the
doctrine itself, and that treatment is far from favorable.
The other case that orbits close to PI situs determination is Sanchez
v. Bowers, but it too is wide of the mark.33 In Sanchez, Judge Learned
Hand determined as a threshold issue that the underlying assets of the
NRNC-owned sociedad de gananciales (a Cuban juridical entity akin to
a partnership) were subject to the physical presence test that existed in
the regulations at that time, on the basis that the NRNC decedent’s
death had caused the sociedad de gananciales, by its terms, to liquidate
and cease to be an entity.34 The estate in question therefore did not
contain any partnership interests, only a chose-in-action of the property
that was formerly held in partnership. In other words, Sanchez does not
apply to situs determination of partnership interests, it applies only to
situs determination of a chose-in-action; as long as partnerships persist
27

277 U.S. 1 (1928).
Glod, supra note 14, at 112. “The Service [in Rev. Rul. 55-701] also cited Blodgett
v. Silberman in support of its conclusion. However, Blodgett provides no support for the
Service’s ruling. In Blodgett, the Supreme Court ruled only that Connecticut’s succession
tax law was constitutional.” Id. at 121 (footnote omitted).
29 Hudson, Jr., supra note 15, at 24; Heimos, supra note 2, at 4.
30 Estate of Vandenhoeck v. Comm’r, 4 T.C. 125, 135 (1944).
31 Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 391 (1933); see also Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U.S.
578, 581 (1902) (“The ancient maxim of the law, mobilia sequuntur personam, was the
outgrowth of conditions which have largely ceased to exist . . . .”).
32 Glod, supra note 14, at 113.
33 70 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1934).
34 Id. at 717.
28
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as an entity after the death of one of its partners, Sanchez is not on
point.
In sum, the state of the law for PI situs determination looks bleak:
the statutes and regulations are silent, agency guidance is virtually nonexistent, and federal case law provides no authoritative holding. Commentators have focused primarily, if not exclusively, on the narrow topic
of PI situs determination in hopes of finding a holding or regulatory
language targeted to this specific type of property. As the foregoing
shows, this line of analysis yields no conclusive outcome. This calls for
an alternate approach.
III. BROOKS
Instead of mining the same regulations and cases for hints of guidance on PI situs rules, the search for helpful authorities should be
broadened to include analogous cases that resolve the situs rules of
property other than PIs, with the aim of identifying the analytical framework and applying it to PIs. This broadened search should be grounded
in the legal principles and foundational jurisprudence that authorized
the imposition of an estate tax on NRNC property in the first place.
Conveniently, there is a 1933 Supreme Court case that accomplishes all
of this: Brooks.35
A. Historical Background and Opinion
From its outset in 1916, the modern estate tax regime included a tax
on nonresident36 decedent property and contained the now-familiar language of “situated in the United States” to define the scope of nonresident gross estates.37 In 1918 the Service issued regulations refining the
scope of “situated in the United States.” The Revenue Act of 1924 and
its accompanying situs regulations mirrored the 1916 Act and the 1918
regulations save for a few minor adjustments.38 It was in this context
that the Supreme Court heard Brooks to decide two questions: (i) the
35

Brooks, 288 U.S. 378.
The additional qualifier of “not a citizen of the United States” did not supplement
“nonresident” in the situs statutes until 1934. Compare Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852,
§ 401, 45 Stat. 791, 862 (deductions for “nonresident decedents”), with 26 U.S.C. §§ 46064 (1934). Therefore, in the context of the Brooks decision, this article refers to the
owner of the partnership interest at issue as “nonresident” and not as NRNC.
37 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 203(b), 39 Stat. 756, 778. This statute is the forerunner of modern day I.R.C. § 2104.
38 The regulations under the 1924 Act provided the following: “Real estate within
the United States, stocks and bonds physically in the United States at date of death,
moneys due on open accounts by domestic debtors, and stock of a corporation or association created or organized in the United States, constitute property having a situs in the
United States.” T.D. 3683 in 137 TREASURY DEP’T, INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE
36
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situs of nonresident property when the type of property at issue was not
addressed in the governing statute or regulations of 1924, and (ii)
whether the federal government has the power to impose an estate tax
on the property of nonresidents.
The facts of Brooks are as follows: the decedent was a British subject who died in 1924 as a resident of Cuba, and who was at no point
engaged in business in the U.S. The decedent’s estate contained various
securities and debt instruments, including stock in foreign corporations,
and the physical certificates evidencing that stock were located in New
York. The 1924 regulations provided physical location situs rules for
some types of nonresident property, but not for others. For instance, the
1924 regulations deemed bonds as “situated in the United States” when
the physical certificates representing those intangibles were physically
located in the U.S.39 The regulations however were silent as to whether
foreign corporation stock certificates physically within U.S. territory
rendered that stock “situated in the United States.” Thus, the first issue
confronting the Brooks Court was one of scope: whether “situated in
the United States” could be stretched to include a type of property unmentioned in the regulations. It is worth noting here the parallels in
Brooks to modern-day PIs, as PIs occupy the same regulatory grey area
in relation to modern-day Treas. Reg. section 20.2104-1(a)(4) as the foreign stock certificates occupied vis-à-vis the 1924 regulations.
The Brooks Court held that the scope of “situated in the United
States” extended to foreign stock certificates physically located in the
U.S., and thus the value of the foreign stock was included in the decedent’s gross estate. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes
reasoned that determining the scope of the statutory and regulatory situs rules was a matter of discerning legislative intent,40 and that this
intent could be discerned from two sources: (i) the situs rules as they
existed at common law prior to the statute’s enactment, and (ii) the legislative history of the statutes and regulations.
First, under the belief that Congress enacted the statute with common law situs doctrines in mind,41 the Court stated that a situs rule
based on the physical location of certificates was “well established” and

UNITED STATES, 1909-1950: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOC§ 303, art. 50 (Bernard D. Reams, ed. 1979).
39 Id.
40 Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 388 (1933).
41 Id. at 389 (“[S]o far as the intention of Congress is concerned, we think that the
principles thus impliedly invoked by the statute were the principles theretofore declared
and then held.”).
UMENTS
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therefore in keeping with common law situs rules.42 Second, the Court
examined the legislative history and concluded that by reenacting the
statute in 1924, Congress evinced a tacit approval of the regulatory situs
rule, in place since 1918, which deemed certificates of foreign bonds as
U.S. situs when physically located in the U.S.43 The Court could find no
reason why Congress would reject a situs rule based on the physical location of foreign stock certificates where it had approved, albeit tacitly,
such a rule for foreign bond certificates.44 The Court thus concluded
that by not expressly applying the physical location situs rule to foreign
stock certificates, the “express terms of these regulations did not go far
enough” and “so far as they did go, they failed to express the legislative
intent.”45 Hence the Court extended the physical location situs rule to
include foreign stock certificates to align with what it deemed to be
Congress’s intent.
Having determined the scope of “situated in the United States,” the
second issue facing the Brooks Court was whether the federal government had the power to lay an estate tax on nonresident decedent property in the first place. This marked the first time that the Supreme Court
considered the constitutional limits of Congress’s power to lay such a
tax. The Court rejected the argument that the Fifth Amendment limitation on the States’ taxing jurisdiction over nonresidents (i.e., residents of
different states within the U.S.) placed a similar limitation on the federal
taxation power over nonresident foreigners.46 Finding no constitutional
constraints, the Court held that the government’s power to tax nonresident property was a function of its national sovereignty in international
relations. Chief Justice Hughes stated that the nonresident’s property
constituted “property within the reach of the power which the United
States by virtue of its sovereignty could exercise as against other nations
and their subjects without violating any established principle of international law.”47 In the final few lines of his opinion, the Chief Justice explained that, “We determine national power in relation to other

42 Id. It is also worth noting that the Court brushed aside the contention that
mobilia sequuntur personam applied here, stating “[t]he Congress did not enact a
maxim.” Id.
43 See note 38, supra, for language of the 1924 regulations.
44 Brooks, 288 U.S. at 393 (“In the view which identifies the property interest with
its physical representative, no sufficient reason appears for holding that bonds were intended to be included, and not certificates of stock, if these were physically in the United
States at the time of death.”).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 403.
47 Id. at 396.

Summer 2021]

SITUS DETERMINATION

391

countries and their subjects by applying the principles of jurisdiction recognized in international relations.”48
Importantly, the Court then proceeded to measure the scope of its
situs rule against the corresponding situs rule at international law, stating, “This view of the scope of the sovereign power in the matter of the
taxation of securities physically within the territorial limits of the sovereign is sustained by high authority and is a postulate of legislative action
in other countries.”49 The Court examined a U.K. domestic case in order to identify the U.K. situs rule for physically present security certificates, and also took into account a British lawmaker’s summary of the
situs rule as it existed at international law.50 For insight into the Italian
position, the Court recommended a Commerce Department pamphlet
on Italian “Tax on Successions” and for the French position it cited to a
1928 treatise titled “French Fiscal Legislation.”51 In all the Court considered the situs laws of the U.K., Italy, and France to ascertain the prevailing situs principles at international law.
Based on the findings of its survey of international sources, the
Court was content that the U.S. situs rule violated no principle of international law. Thus, the Court ruled that the provisions of the 1916 Revenue Act, as amended by the 1924 Act, authorizing the tax of nonresident
decedent property “situated in the United States” was decidedly within
the federal government’s taxing power.52
B. Application to Partnership Interests
As state previously, the parallels between the foreign stock certificates of Brooks and modern-day PIs are apparent. And as there are no
statutes, regulations, agency guidance, or federal cases directly on point
for determining PI situs rules, Brooks is arguably the best authority for
predicting how a U.S. court would determine the scope of “situated in
the United States” under section 2104 and its regulations in relation to
PIs.
The Brooks Court chose to structure its opinion as sequential analyses of two separate issues: (i) determining the scope of the specific statutory situs rule, and then (ii) resolving whether the government had the
power to lay the tax. But these two issues are both essentially about
scope, as the government has the power to lay the tax only if the situs
rule is within the scope of “principles of jurisdiction recognized in inter48
49
50
51
52

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

406 (emphasis added).
396.
396-97.
398 n.6.
406.
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national relations.”53 Therefore Brooks could be characterized as containing an implicit second step for determining the scope of situs rules
under section 2104 that accounts for the prevailing situs rules at international law.54 Accordingly, the Court’s analytical approach can be recast
as a two-step scope test: the first analyzes congressional intent to discern
the scope of the specific situs rule; the second analyzes situs principles at
international law to ensure the situs rule does not violate those
principles.
1. Step One: Congressional Intent
As discussed above, step one of Brooks determines the scope of
“situated in the United States” by discerning congressional intent by (i)
surveying the predominant situs doctrines at common law, and (ii) reviewing the statute’s legislative history. For the Brooks Court in 1933,
this line of analysis required that it review the legislative history of the
eight years between 1916 and 1924, as well as the common law situs
doctrines as they existed around 1916. If a court today were to attempt
this same line of analysis, it would be required to review over a century
of shifting legislative history and common law situs doctrines.55 On top
of this, and as various esteemed commentators have shown, Congress
and the Service have been reluctant to provide any insight into which
situs rule they prefer when it comes to PIs. This reality means that a
court would have paltry little from which to discern congressional intent.
Nonetheless, on the few occasions that Congress or the Service has engaged with the situs rules of PIs, U.S. treaty law has played an important
role which should not be ignored when assessing congressional intent.
First, when Congress initially promulgated section 2104 in its modern form in 1954, the House and Senate committee reports expressly
stated that the new situs rule it contained was chosen because it “conforms to the tax conventions the United States has entered into with
many countries.”56 Thus, although not PI-specific, there is precedent for
Congress to enact domestic legislation to sync with, or at least in consideration of, the situs rules of U.S. treaty law. Second, although Congress
53 Id. (“We determine national power in relation to other countries and their subjects by applying the principles of jurisdiction recognized in international relations. Applying those principles we cannot doubt that the Congress had the power to enact the
statute, as we have construed and applied it to the property in question.” (emphasis
added)).
54 See I.R.C. § 2104.
55 A clear instance of a situs doctrine falling out of favor in the past century was
when Congress enacted I.R.C. § 2104 to remove the physical location test for certificates
of foreign stock, directly reversing the Brooks Court decision. See H.R. REP. NO. 831337, at 92 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 125-26 (1954).
56 H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337; S. REP. NO. 83-1622.
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has remained silent on PI situs determination since 1916, in that time it
has ratified and amended more than a dozen bilateral estate tax treaties,
several of which create express PI situs rules,57 and the PI situs rules of
these treaties provide a rare glimpse into Congress’s thinking on the
subject.
In summary, while applying step one reveals nothing concrete
about which situs rule Congress would apply to PIs, it shows, at the very
least, that Congress has considered U.S. treaty law when defining the
scope of “situated in the United States” regarding NRNC decedent
property in general and PIs specifically. Therefore, a court attempting to
discern Congress’s intent, per Brooks, could benefit from understanding
the PI situs rules in U.S. treaty law.
2. Step Two: Norms at International Law
Step two of Brooks shifts the analytical focus to the international
sphere. In Brooks the Court surveyed the situs rules of the U.K., Italy
and France to confirm that the situs rule it identified in step one was in
keeping with the “principles of jurisdiction recognized in international
relations.”58 By contrast, in applying the Brooks framework to PIs, the
step one analysis produces no concrete situs rule for the reasons discussed above. Hence step two of the analysis is of added importance for
ascertaining a situs rule for PIs.
It bears mentioning here that consulting international law to interpret U.S. legislation can be controversial but doing so in this particular
context makes sense. First, compared to the 1933 context in which
Brooks was decided, situs principles at international law have grown
substantially more robust. Given the importance Brooks attached to international law in determining the scope of the federal taxing power, it
is hard to believe that the Brooks Court would have ignored the situs
provisions of international tax treaties to which the U.S. is party had
they existed at the time,59 especially considering the fact that the Brooks
Court mentioned the tax convention negotiations that were ongoing between the U.S. and other countries.60 Second, consulting U.S. treaty law
for clarification on an innately international topic is distinguishable from
57 In total, the U.S. has ratified bilateral estate tax treaties with 16 nations, 14 of
which are still active. For a timeline and table of bilateral estate tax treaties to which the
U.S. is party, see infra Appendices A and B.
58 Brooks, 288 U.S. at 405-06.
59 No bilateral estate tax treaty existed at the time Brooks was decided. The first
bilateral estate tax treaty to which the U.S. was party was the now repealed 1945 U.S.U.K. Estate Tax Convention. See supra note 22.
60 Brooks, 288 U.S. at 399-400.
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controversial cases such as Roper v. Simmons, wherein international
norms informed the interpretation of a purely domestic issue.61
Before moving into the treaty analysis section, a review of the discussion up to this point may be of use. The statutes, regulations, agency
guidance and case law are virtually silent on PI situs. Brooks explained
the jurisprudential underpinning for imposing an estate tax on nonresidents, and presented what was effectively a two-step analytical framework for defining the scope of “situated in the United States” for types
of property unmentioned in the statutes or regulations (i.e., modern-day
section 2104 and Treas. Reg. section 20.2104-1(a)(4)). In applying this
two-step test to PIs, the step one analysis, having become unworkable
due to the statutory and regulatory silence towards PIs over the past
century, yielded no clear situs rule. On the other hand, step two of the
Brooks framework – situs principles at international law – offers an opportunity to explore a field of law that could provide specific guidance
on PI situs rules.
IV. SITUS RULES

AT

INTERNATIONAL LAW

In applying step two of Brooks, the discussion below begins with a
general survey of bilateral estate tax treaties to identify trends and establish context. The focus shifts to bilateral estate tax treaties to which
the U.S. is party, considering first those treaties that contain express PI
situs rules and secondly those that do not. The takeaway from this survey is that there are two accepted international norms to which the U.S.
adheres regarding PI situs: 1) the U.S. may tax the underlying assets of
an NRNC-owned partnership but only to the extent that those assets are
part of a “permanent establishment” physically located in the U.S., and
only to the extent of the NRNC’s interest in the partnership, and 2) the
NRNC’s domicile State has sole taxing authority over PIs. Although
these two norms are not co-extensive and thus do not provide a singular
situs rule for step two of Brooks, they serve to identify the outer limits
of U.S. taxing jurisdiction over PIs at international law.
A. Bilateral Estate Tax Treaties
The vast majority of estate tax62 treaties fall into one of two categories: situs-based treaties or domicile-based treaties (hereinafter “Situs
Treaties” and “Domicile Treaties”). Situs Treaties appeared in the first
61 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). In Roper, the Court in a 5-4 decision held that changing
societal standards rendered the execution of minors “cruel and unusual punishment” as
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. As evidence of the evolving standards, the Court
pointed to “overwhelming” international opinion against the execution of minors.
62 For convenience, inheritance tax, gift tax, succession tax, stamp duties, and any
other type of tax that applies to gratuitous transfers or transfers occurring by reason of
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wave of estate tax treaty formation in the late 1940s and 1950s, and
Domicile Treaties appeared in the second wave in the late 1960s through
the 1980s. Domicile Treaties closely adhere to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Estate, Inheritance and
Gift Model Convention and its Commentary (hereinafter “OECD
Model Estate Tax Treaty”), which was first published in 1966 and revised in 1982.63
Situs Treaties seek to avoid double taxation on the basis of both
States claiming property situs, or one State claiming right to tax based
on situs and the other claiming right to tax based on some personal affiliation (e.g., domicile, residence, citizenship, etc.). The primary focus for
Domicile Treaties, on the other hand, is to prevent a type of double
taxation that occurs by virtue of each State claiming some personal affiliation with the decedent. Each Domicile Treaty has a “fiscal domicile”
provision which serves as a tiebreaker when a decedent has multiple
personal affiliations with the two States. Domicile Treaties then proceed
to identify specific categories of property that the non-fiscal domicile
State may tax on the basis of that property being located in its territory
(i.e., on the basis of situs). These specific situs property categories are
limited to “immovable property”64 and property that comprises a “permanent establishment.”65 Some Domicile Treaties also provide that assets pertaining to a fixed base used for performance of a “professional
service” or “independent personal service” may be taxed by the situs
State as well.66 The State claiming the right to tax based on situs of
immovable property, permanent establishment property, or professional/independent personal service property has jurisdictional primacy
to tax. Any property that does not qualify as situs property or is not
mentioned by the situs rules is taxed by the fiscal domicile State.67 Thus,
death are referred to as estate tax. Bilateral treaties that deal with income tax in addition
to estate tax are not within the scope of this article.
63 OECD, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON ESTATES AND INHERITANCES AND ON GIFTS (1983).
64 Id. at 57-58.
65 Id. at 59.
66 Id. at 62.
67 See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Estates of Deceased Persons and on Gifts, U.S.U.K., art. 5(1)(a), Oct. 19, 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 9580 [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Treaty] (“Subject to the provisions of Articles 6 (Immovable Property (Real Property)) and 7 (Business Property of a Permanent Establishment and Assets Pertaining to a Fixed Base Used
for the Performance of Independent Personal Services) and the following paragraphs of
this Article, if the decedent or transferor was domiciled in one of the Contracting States
at the time of the death or transfer, property shall not be taxable in the other State.”).
For full citations to bilateral estate tax treaties to which the U.S. is party, see infra Appendix B.
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an NRNC estate seeking relief under a Domicile Treaty must first identify the fiscal domicile of the decedent, and then identify which property
located in the non-fiscal domicile State qualifies as “immovable,” “permanent establishment” or “professional/independent personal service”
property.
The Domicile Treaty framework has become the norm at international law for bilateral estate tax treaties. Among the countries that impose an estate tax68 the vast majority of bilateral estate tax treaties in
force today are between OECD member countries.69 Moreover, nearly
every bilateral estate tax treaty enacted after the 1966 OECD Model
Estate Tax Treaty was published has been a Domicile Treaty modeled
after the OECD Model Estate Tax Treaty.70 France’s approach to bilateral estate tax treaty formation makes it the only country that could be
said to challenge the Domicile Treaty norm, but even France adheres to
the norm roughly as often as it eschews it. France is party to roughly two
dozen bilateral income tax treaties which incorporate estate tax provisions.71 However France is also party to a number of estate tax-only
treaties, including with the U.S., each of which adheres to the Domicile
Treaty framework.72
Other than partial divergence by France, the norm at international
law is well established: if two States intend to enter into a bilateral estate tax treaty, they will almost invariably employ the Domicile Treaty
framework in doing so.73 As such, bilateral estate tax treaties which employ the Domicile Treaty framework represent the area of law best
suited to produce a situs rule norm for partnership interests.74
68 As of 2015, 43 countries impose an estate tax, of which 19 are OECD member
countries. See Alan Cole, Estate and Inheritance Taxes around the World, 458 TAX
FOUND. (Mar. 17, 2015), https://taxfoundation.org/estate-and-inheritance-taxes-aroundworld/ [https://perma.cc/X2FT-UQLT].
69 See infra Appendix C; EY, WORLDWIDE ESTATE AND INHERITANCE TAX GUIDE
448 (2020) (ebook).
70 See infra Appendix C.
71 EY, supra note 69, at 132.
72 Id.
73 Model Double Tax’n Convention between Developed and Developing Countries,
U.N. Doc. SER.E/213, at v, vii (2017).
74 Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 398 n.6 (1933). The domestic law of countries that
impose an estate tax is another potential source for identifying international situs norms.
In fact, the Brooks Court surveyed the domestic laws of the U.K., Italy and France. The
primary difficulty inherent in identifying situs norms for partnerships interests in the domestic laws of other countries is the fact that these countries’ laws rarely contain the
juridical equivalent of a partnership. Although foreign entities that parallel U.S. partnerships in terms of registration requirements, liability, etc., certainly exist, exploring the
situs rules associated with those entities is beyond the scope of this article.
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B. Partnership Interest Situs Rules in Bilateral Estate Tax Treaties
The U.S. is currently party to 14 bilateral estate tax treaties,75
though if one includes the U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty, which folds
in estate tax considerations, the count is 15.76 Non-treaty countries
clearly outnumber the 14 treaty countries; however a highly disproportionate amount of NRNCs filing estate tax returns with the Service are
domiciled in these 14 countries. In fact, a majority of 706-NA forms –
the form which NRNCs must file for U.S. estate tax purposes – comes
from treaty countries.77 Thus, as far as the U.S. is concerned, more
NRNC estates evaluate their tax burden based on the provisions of the
14 bilateral treaties than do solely based on I.R.C. sections 2101-2108.78
The 14 bilateral estate tax treaties to which the U.S. is party are far
from uniform and span many decades,79 but there are also clear and
consistent patterns across these treaties which reinforce international
law norms. Most importantly, in recent decades the U.S. has comported
with the established international norm of employing Domicile Treaties:
since 1966, each of the six bilateral estate tax treaties the U.S. has signed
and ratified was a Domicile Treaty. As such the situs provisions of these
six treaties represent the clearest example of U.S. acceptance of international situs norms in the estate tax context.

75

See infra Appendix B.
The U.S.-Canada Estate Tax Treaty was terminated in 1961 after Canada replaced
its estate tax in favor of an income tax on gains at death. The U.S.-Canada Income Tax
Treaty now governs the interaction between this Canadian tax and the U.S. transfer
taxes. Because the U.S.-Canada tax agreement is an outlier, it is disregarded for the purposes of this article. Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Ca.U.S., art. II, Sept. 26, 1980, 1469 UNTS 189.
77 Between 2009 and 2014 (the most recent years in which the data is available),
estates from treaty countries filed 3,181 706-NA forms. In that same timeframe estates
from non-treaty countries filed only 1,012. See SOI Tax Stats - Nonresident Alien Estate
Tax Returns with Non-Treaty Status, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-nonresident-alien-estate-tax-returns-with-non-treaty-status (last updated Dec. 3, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/PZ8T-UP88]; see SOI Tax Stats - Nonresident Alien Estate Tax Returns
with Treaty Status, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-nonresident-alien-estate-tax-returns-with-treaty-status (last updated Jan. 6, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9ZHTKF4C].
78 A taxpayer is never required to use an estate tax treaty, and a taxpayer may only
use a treaty’s situs rules instead of those in the Code when there is some benefit to doing
so. See Glod, supra note 14, at 109 n.2. Thus, not every NRNC domiciled in a treaty
country seeks relief under the applicable U.S. bilateral treaty, but the estate will nonetheless evaluate its tax burden under an available treaty to determine if a benefit accrues.
79 The longest standing of these treaties was signed in 1949, and the most recent
update to an active treaty occurred in 2004. See infra Appendix A.
76
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Of the six Domicile Treaties to which the U.S. is party, three expressly address PI situs: France, Netherlands, and Germany.80 These
three treaties have important differences, but as their PI-specific provisions share an overarching conceptual framework, it is appropriate to
consider them first as a group. As Domicile Treaties, they set out the
criteria for establishing fiscal domicile.81 The treaties then define, with
slight variations, “immovable property” and “permanent establishment”
– the latter of which is characterized as “a fixed place of business”
through which business is carried on, which is then further defined with
a list of examples of what is and is not a “permanent establishment.”82
Like all Domicile Treaties, the treaties assign primary taxing jurisdiction
over the property that comprises the “permanent establishment” “immovable property” or “professional/independent personal service” to
the State in which property is physically located, i.e., the situs State, and
any property not qualifying as such is subject to tax by the fiscal domicile State.83
The France, Germany and Netherlands treaties stipulate, in varying
ways, that assets of a permanent establishment are taxable by the situs
State to the extent of the decedent’s interest in the partnership. In other
words, the treaties set out a situs rule of “engaged in trade or business”
mixed with permanent establishment considerations, which is a function
of physical asset location. The situs State is permitted to look through
the partnership interest to the underlying assets, but only regarding assets that qualify as part of a permanent establishment – what is otherwise known as an “aggregate approach.” Thus, the general rule under
these Domicile Treaties is that the U.S. may tax PIs to the extent of
80 As mentioned previously, the U.S.-Australia Treaty – a Situs Treaty – directly
addresses PIs as well, but it is an outlier and not representative of the norm at international law. The rule itself is vague and no longer applies in practice as Australia repealed
its estate tax in 1979. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on the Estates of Deceased Persons,
Austl.-U.S., art. 3(1)(g), May 14, 1953, T.I.A.S. 2903; Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, U.S. Estate
and Gift Tax Treaties, 851-2nd T.M. (2003).
81 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Estates and Inheritances, Neth.-U.S., art. 4, July 15,
1969, T.I.A.S. No. 7061 [hereinafter U.S.-Netherlands Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Estates, Inheritances and Gifts, Fr.-U.S., art. 4, Nov. 24, 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 9812 [hereinafter U.S.-France Treaty]; Convention for Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on
Estates, Inheritances, and Gifts, Ger.-U.S., art. 4, Dec. 3, 1980, T.I.A.S. 11082 [hereinafter U.S.-Germany Treaty].
82 U.S.-Germany Treaty, supra note 81, art. 5(2), 6(2)(a); U.S.-France Treaty, supra
note 81, art. 5(2), 6(2); U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, supra note 81, art. 6(2), 7(2).
83 U.S.-France Treaty, supra note 81, art. 8; U.S.-Germany Treaty, supra note 81, art.
9; U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, supra note 81, art. 8.
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assets forming part of a permanent establishment located in the U.S.,
and only to the extent of the decedent’s interest in the partnership.
Having established the general framework of these three treaties,
the next step is to engage with the PI-specific provisions of each treaty
and understand the points of divergence. Article 6 of the U.S.-France
Treaty (as amended by the 2004 Protocol) states in relevant part:
Article 6 Business property of a permanent establishment and
assets pertaining to a fixed base used for the performance of
professional services
1. [A]ssets . . . used in or held for use in the conduct of the
business of a permanent establishment may be taxed by a Contracting State if the permanent establishment is situated
therein.
2. For purposes of this Convention, the term “permanent establishment” means a fixed place of business through which
the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. If an
individual is a member of a partnership or other similar passthrough entity which is engaged in industrial or commercial activity through a fixed place of business, he shall be deemed to
have been so engaged to the extent of his interest therein.84
As for the antecedent question of what qualifies as an “enterprise,” the
U.S.-France Treaty defines “enterprise” as an “industrial or commercial” undertaking or activity.85 If we apply this definition to Article 6,
permanent establishment must mean “a fixed place of business through
which the business of an industrial or commercial activity is wholly or
partly carried on.” If an activity is neither industrial nor commercial in
nature, then it is not a permanent establishment, and thus the assets of
that activity do not qualify for Article 6 look-through, aggregate treatment. As PIs are not mentioned elsewhere under the U.S.-France Treaty
situs rules, PIs in non-commercial, non-industrial activities qualify as an
unmentioned type of property taxable solely by the fiscal domicile
State.86 Additionally, the U.S.-France Treaty, unlike the Germany and
Netherlands treaties, categorizes a fixed place of business that engages
solely in investment activities as not permanent establishment property,
further narrowing the types of partnerships that would be subject to a
look-through, aggregate approach.87
84
85
86
87

U.S.-France Treaty, supra note 81, art. 6(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
Id. art. 3(1)(d).
Id. art. 8.
Id. art. 6(4)(f).
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If the activity is industrial or commercial, then the partner is taxed
“to the extent of his interest therein” by the State in which the assets of
the activity are located.88 There is some debate over the grammatical
object to which the adverb “therein” refers, as it could refer to the partnership, or it could refer to the activity. One commentator, without citing any sources, contends that “therein” must refer to the activity.89 The
better interpretation is that “therein” refers to the partner’s interest in
the partnership, not in the activity. It is hard to see how a partner’s
interest could include certain partnership activities and exclude others.
And it is only reasonable that the assets attributable to the partner be
limited to the extent of the partner’s interest in the partnership. Therefore, “his interest therein” must refer to the partner’s interest in the
partnership.
The PI provision of the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty closely mirrors
that of the U.S.-France Treaty. It states in relevant part:
Article 7 Business property of a permanent establishment and
assets pertaining to a fixed base used for the performance of
professional services
1. Assets . . . forming part of the business property of a permanent establishment may be taxed by a State if the permanent
establishment is situated in that State.
2. For purposes of this Convention, the term “permanent establishment” means a fixed place of business through which a
decedent was engaged in trade or business. A decedent shall be
deemed to have been engaged in trade or business through a
fixed place of business whether he is so engaged as a sole proprietor or through a partnership or other unincorporated association, but in the case of a partnership or association, only to
the extent of his interest therein . . . .90
The U.S.-Netherlands Treaty uses the same phrasing as the U.S.France Treaty regarding “his interest therein” and thus the above analysis is equally applicable to this treaty. Unlike the U.S.-France Treaty
however, the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty contains no “enterprise” requirement when defining “permanent establishment” and therefore PIs of
non-commercial, non-industrial business undertakings could qualify for
situs State taxation under the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty where they
would not so qualify under the U.S.-France Treaty.91
88

Id. art. 6(2).
Cassell et al., supra note 9, at 574 (“‘therein’ appears to refer to the activity rather
than the partnership.”).
90 U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, supra note 81, art. 7.
91 Id. Among the Domicile Treaties to which the U.S. is party, Germany, France,
and the U.K. define “enterprise” as an “industrial or commercial” undertaking or activ89
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The PI provision of the U.S.-Germany Treaty is structured somewhat differently, but its scope and effect are similar to those of the U.S.Netherlands Treaty. In relevant part, it states:
Article 8: Partnership Interests
An interest in a partnership which forms part of the estate
of or of a gift made by a person domiciled in a contracting
State, which partnership owns property described in Article 5
or 6, may be taxed by the State in which such property is situated, but only to the extent that the value of such interest is
attributable to such property.92
Article 8 imposes a look-through, aggregate approach to property mentioned in Articles 5 and 6. In Article 6, the U.S.-Germany Treaty, like
the U.S.-France Treaty, narrows permanent establishment to commercial or industrial business undertakings.93 However the unique feature
of the U.S.-Germany Treaty is that Articles 5 and 6 concern not only
assets comprising a permanent establishment, but also “assets . . . pertaining to a fixed base . . . used for the performance of independent
personal services.” By contrast, the look-through rule prescribed by the
France and Netherlands treaties apply solely to permanent establishment assets. The term “independent personal services” is not defined
anywhere in the treaty, but its inclusion certainly broadens the scope of
the U.S.-Germany Treaty’s look-through rule beyond partnerships engaging in commercial or industrial activities.
In sum, the PI provisions of the Germany, Netherlands and France
treaties all impose a similar rule, but the scope of that rule varies from
treaty to treaty. All three treaties impose a look-through, aggregate approach to a partnership’s underlying assets when those assets are part of
a permanent establishment. And those assets are taxable by the situs
State to the extent of the decedent’s interest in the partnership. By limiting permanent establishment to commercial and industrial activities, the
U.S.-France Treaty applies a look-through, aggregate approach only to
permanent establishment assets of partnerships of a commercial or industrial nature, and it specifically excepts investment activities from
qualifying as part of a permanent establishment. The U.S.-Netherlands
Treaty provides a broader look-through, aggregate approach whereby
permanent establishment assets of a partnership engaging in business
activities of any nature are subject to the look-through, aggregate rule.
ity; the Austria and Denmark treaties use the term but do not define it; and the Netherlands treaty does not use the term at all. U.S.-Germany Treaty, supra note 81, art. 3(c)(d);
U.S.-France Treaty, supra note 81, art. 3(d); U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 67, art. 3(c);
U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, supra note 81, art. 5.
92 U.S.-Germany Treaty, supra note 81, art. 8.
93 Id. art. 6(2).
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Lastly, the look-through, aggregate approach under the U.S.-Germany
Treaty applies to permanent establishment assets of a partnership engaging in commercial or industrial business activities as well as to assets
used in the performance of independent personal services from a fixed
base.
For illustrative purposes, consider the partnership of the hypothetical NRNC decedent from country Q described in the Introduction,
which held a consultancy that had operations in the U.S. and abroad.
Assuming the consultancy owned by the partnership had assets that otherwise qualify as part of permanent establishment located in the U.S.,
whether and to what extent the U.S. has taxing jurisdiction would vary
from treaty to treaty. Under the U.S.-France Treaty, the look-through,
aggregate approach does not apply because the consultancy cannot be
said to be commercial or industrial in nature, and thus the property that
passes under the treaty is a partnership interest, not its underlying assets. As the U.S.-France Treaty’s situs rules do not otherwise mention
partnership interests, the interests are taxable only by the fiscal domicile
State, i.e., France.94 Under the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, the U.S. may
tax the underlying permanent establishment assets of the consultancy, as
there is no commercial or industrial requirement under that treaty. As
for the U.S.-Germany Treaty, whether the U.S. could tax the partnership’s underlying assets depends upon whether a consultancy qualifies as
a “fixed based” for providing “independent personal services.” If it does
so qualify, then the assets are taxable by the U.S.; if not, then Germany,
in its capacity as the fiscal domicile State, has sole taxing jurisdiction
over the PIs.95
Ascertaining the situs rule norms at international law in satisfaction
of Brooks step two requires identifying general trends across bilateral
treaties. These general trends can only be identified by applying principles of treaty interpretation to the text of individual treaties. Unfortunately treaty interpretation can be notoriously inconsistent.96 This is
partly because keeping decades-old treaty texts up to date with everchanging business models and methods necessitates administrative bodies, such as the U.S. Treasury and the OECD, to issue treaty interpretation guidance.97 While a comprehensive review of treaty interpretation
94

U.S.-France Treaty, supra note 81, art. 8.
It should be noted that the above analysis applies only when the NRNC is a domiciliary of the treaty State. There are situations in which a decedent is a domiciliary of
neither the U.S. nor the treaty State, but has operations and business assets in each.
Taxing jurisdiction in such situations is governed by treaty provisions separate than those
discussed here.
96 See Schoenblum, supra note 80.
97 Michael S. Kirsch, The Limits of Administrative Guidance in the Interpretation of
Tax Treaties, 87 TEX L. REV. 1063, 1067-68 (2009).
95
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principles is beyond the scope of this article, there are a handful of interpretive tools specific to bilateral tax treaties that a court applying
Brooks step two should consult, and thus deserve mention here.
In the domestic sphere, the U.S. Treasury issues administrative interpretive guidance for bilateral estate tax treaties in three forms: i)
Technical Explanations that accompany each treaty, ii) the U.S. Model
Estate and Gift Tax Treaty (hereinafter “U.S. Model Estate Tax
Treaty”),98 and iii) the Technical Explanation of the U.S. Model Estate
Tax Treaty.99 U.S. courts and the Service have shown a willingness to
rely upon these materials or their income tax equivalent.100 Internationally, the OECD provides two interpretive tools that U.S. courts and the
Service have relied upon in the past: i) the OECD Model Estate Tax
Treaty, and ii) the Commentary to the OECD Model Estate Tax
Treaty.101
Moreover, administrative-type guidance occasionally identifies
other resources which were consulted or copied writ-large when drafting
the treaty text, which arguably expands the interpretive toolkit to encompass those sources as well. The technical explanations of several estate tax treaties expressly state that some of the terms used in the estate
tax treaties are derived from or substantially similar to the definitions of
corresponding U.S. income tax treaties.102 The OECD Model Estate
Tax Treaty provides guidance on the origin of some terms. For instance,
it provides that the definition of “permanent establishment” was taken
verbatim from the 1977 OECD Income Tax Model Convention, and that
the Commentary to the Income Tax Model Convention is equally applicable in the estate tax context.103 Although useful and copious, guidance
98

U.S. Model Est. and Gift Tax Treaty (1980), Tax Treaties (CCH) ¶ 214 (2010).
Treas. Dep’t Technical Explanation, U.S. Model Estate and Gift Tax Treaty, Tax
Treaties (CCH) ¶ 217 (2010).
100 See, e.g., PLR 9806012 (Feb. 6, 1998) (relying upon the Technical Explanation of
the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty); Rev. Rul. 86-145, 1986-2 C.B. 297 (relying upon a
Treasury Department Technical Explanation of the U.S.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty for determining the meaning of “tax year concerned”).
101 See, e.g., United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9, 15-17 (2d Cir. 1975)
(relying upon OECD Model Estate Tax Treaty).
102 See, e.g., COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX TREATY WITH
THE FRENCH REP., S. REP. NO. 96-3, app. B, at 42 (1979) (“The definition is substantially
similar to the definition of ‘permanent establishment’ in Article 4 of the Income Tax
Convention between the United States and the French Republic signed on July 28,
1967.”); Tax Conventions with Belgium, Finland, Trinidad and Tobago, and The Netherlands: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Rel., 91st Cong. 112-13 (1970) (“The article
defines the term ‘permanent establishment.’ The definition is an updated adaptation of
the definition found in the Income Tax Convention between the United States and the
Netherlands.”).
103 OECD Model Estate Tax Treaty, art. 6 cmt. § 5 (“The definition of permanent
establishment in paragraphs 2 to 5 is taken verbatim from paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
99
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from income tax materials should be applied with caution to the estate
tax context as small variations and contextual considerations can lead to
the legal equivalent of false cognates.
C. Bilateral Treaties where Partnership Interests not Expressly
Mentioned
The three Domicile Treaties to which the U.S. is party that do not
expressly address PIs are the U.K., Denmark and Austria treaties. The
PI situs rule of these three treaties differs from the one identified in the
previous section. Lacking any PI-specific provision, PIs under the U.K.,
Denmark and Austria treaties qualify as “property not expressly mentioned.” As discussed previously, Domicile Treaties afford sole taxing
authority of “property not expressly mentioned” to the fiscal domicile
State. Thus, as regards the PIs of the hypothetical decedent, the U.S.
would have no jurisdiction to impose an estate tax, as he is not a domiciliary of the U.S.
Consideration should also be given to the treatment of PIs under
the U.S. Model Estate and Gift Tax Treaty as it treats PIs in much the
same manner as the U.K., Denmark and Austria treaties. Largely based
on the OECD Model Estate Tax Treaty, the U.S. Model Estate Tax
Treaty follows the Domicile Treaty framework and contains a “property
not expressly mentioned” article typical of the bilateral estate tax treaties to which the U.S. is party.104 Also like the U.K., Denmark and Austria treaties, the U.S. Model Estate Tax Treaty contains no PI-specific
provision. An illustrative example in the Technical Explanation of the
U.S. Model Estate Tax Treaty sheds light on the treatment of PIs under
treaties with no PI-specific rule. In explaining Article 7 (Property Not
Expressly Mentioned) of the U.S. Model Estate Tax Treaty, the Technical Explanation provides the following example:
Suppose, for example, that a domiciliary of the other Contracting State transferred an interest in a partnership owning
U.S. real property. If the other Contracting State considered it
a transfer of real property and the United States considered it
a transfer of a partnership interest, the transfer would be determined, under paragraph 2, to be a transfer of a partnership inArticle 5 of the 1977 Income Tax Model, so that only a brief explanation need be given
here. Although more restricted in scope, these paragraphs apply in the same way to taxes
on estates, inheritances and on gifts as they do to taxes on income. Consequently, the
Commentary on the above-mentioned Article 5 applies equally to them, notwithstanding
that it has not been reproduced here in its entirety.”).
104 U.S. Model Estate and Gift Tax Treaty, Tax Treaties (CCH) ¶ 214.07 (2010).
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terest. Consequently, the other State would have the sole taxing
right under Article 7 (Property Not Expressly Mentioned).105
The example chosen by the Treasury in the Technical Explanation
clearly shows that when property is deemed to be a partnership interest
(in this case, under the tiebreaker rule of Article 7(2)), and the applicable treaty contains no PI-specific rule, then the fiscal domicile State has
sole taxing authority over the PI by way of the treaty’s “property not
expressly mentioned” article. This supports the conclusion above that,
under the U.K., Denmark and Austria treaties, the U.S. would have no
taxing authority over the hypothetical decedent’s PI as his fiscal domicile would not be in the U.S.
The Technical Explanation’s example sidesteps an antecedent issue
regarding PI situs determination that deserves discussion: whether U.S.
domestic law would in fact categorize the transfer of a partnership interest as a transfer of personal property or as a transfer of underlying assets
for estate tax purposes. To be clear, this issue is separate from that of
categorizing entities organized under foreign law. So far, this article has
exclusively considered the situation where an NRNC owns interests in a
partnership organized under the laws of a U.S. state, and thus the juridical character of the entity is known (i.e., it is a state law partnership). By
contrast, when an NRNC-owned partnership is organized under a foreign law, a host of unresolved questions regarding the correct corresponding U.S. juridical categorization of the entity (or non-entity) arises
which is beyond the scope of this article. However, even putting the
foreign entity issue aside, the federal government’s treatment of transfers of interests in partnerships and similar pass-throughs organized
under U.S. law is not entirely settled.
The most relevant case is the 2009 Tax Court case of Pierre v. Commissioner, in which the court held in a 10-6 decision that a gift of an
interest in a single-member LLC constituted a gift of personal property,
not a gift of its underlying assets, despite the fact that the income tax
check-the-box entity categorization rules of section 7701 treated the single-member LLC as a disregarded entity.106 Pierre addressed a gift tax
transfer, and some doubt still remains as to whether its holding applies
to estate tax transfers of interests in entities that are classified as disregarded entities under the check-the-box rules.
The more likely outcome is that Pierre will be extended to estate
tax transfers. The Pierre court consistently refers to the “Federal estate
and gift tax statutes” as a singular consideration throughout its opinion
105 Treas. Dep’t Technical Explanation, U.S. Model Estate and Gift Tax Treaty, supra
note 99, ¶ 217 (emphasis added).
106 133 T.C. 24, 26-27, 51 (2009).
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and in its holding,107 and it expressly states that the “Federal estate tax
is interpreted in pari materia with the Federal gift tax.”108 Thus, the
likely outcome is that Pierre will be extended to estate tax transfers, and
therefore, as the example in the Technical Explanation assumes, the
transfer of a partnership interest would be treated as a transfer of personal property not expressly mentioned in the treaty’s situs rules taxable
solely by the fiscal domicile State.109
V. CONCLUSION
Brooks step two mandates that in determining the scope of a situs
rule regarding NRNC property unmentioned in section 2104 or its regulations, a situs rule that adheres to, or at least does not violate, the corresponding situs norms at international law is a valid exercise of the U.S.
taxing authority in its capacity as a sovereign power in international relations. Domicile Treaties are the norm at international law for bilateral
estate tax treaties, and from the six Domicile Treaties to which the U.S.
is party, two situs rules for PIs emerge: First, the U.S. may tax the underlying assets of an NRNC-owned partnership but only to the extent
that those assets are part of a “permanent establishment” physically located in the U.S., and only to the extent of the NRNC’s interest in the
partnership. The definition of permanent establishment can vary from
treaty to treaty, and some treaties apply the look-through, aggregate approach to partnership assets that do not necessarily comprise part of a
permanent establishment; however permanent establishment assets of a
commercial or industrial undertaking are invariably subject to the rule.
Second, the NRNC’s domicile State has sole taxing authority over PIs
held by the NRNC at death regardless of whether the underlying assets
comprise what could be deemed a permanent establishment in the U.S.
Although the two situs rules that emerge from applying Brooks do
not provide a singular situs rule for PIs, taken together they establish, at
the very least, which situs rules are not viable. To wit, step two of
Brooks rejects a situs rule based on the partnership’s place of organization. It likewise rejects a situs rule that would include partnership assets
located outside the U.S. in the NRNC’s gross estate by virtue of some
partnership assets being located in the U.S. or by virtue of some partnership business being carried on in the U.S.
107

Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 36 n.9.
109 But see Barnet Jr., supra note 16, at 1098, 1100 (arguing that extending Pierre to
estate tax transfers would be unwarranted primarily because Pierre addressed fair market
valuation of gifts, which is a matter of fact, whereas situs determination is a matter of
law).
108
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The exact extent to which the look-through, aggregate rule applies
is unresolved, partly due to the discrepancies between provisions in specific bilateral treaties, and partly due to persisting uncertainties in treaty
interpretation generally. Furthermore, the antecedent issue of whether
the holding in Pierre will be extended to partnership interests transferred by reason of death is likewise unresolved. Until these two outstanding issues are settled, or until Congress or the Service deigns to
address PI situs determination directly, it is impossible to say what portion of the hypothetical decedent’s PI will be included in his U.S. gross
estate. In the meantime, administrators of estates similarly situated to
that of the hypothetical decedent must endure the disquiet of an uncertain tax liability, as they have done for decades. Hopefully the alternate
approach to PI situs determination advanced by this article succeeded in
reducing, if only marginally, the extent of that uncertainty.
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APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF BILATERAL ESTATE TAX TREATIES
WHICH U.S. IS PARTY

TO

Ireland 1949
Norway 1949 T/2015
Switzerland 1951
Finland 1952
S. Africa 1952
Australia 1953
Japan 1954
Italy 1955
1950

1960

Greece 1950 P/1964

Netherlands 1969
1970
U.K. 1978
Austria 1982
Denmark 1983
Sweden 1983 T/2008

1980

1990

Germany 1980 P/1998
2000
France 1978 P/2004

2010
P/ = Protocol
T/ = Terminated
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TO WHICH

U.S.

IS

Bilateral Treaty Citations
Australia (Situs Treaty) Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on the Estates of Deceased Persons, U.S.-Austl., May 14, 1953,
T.I.A.S. 2903.
NOTE: Australia no longer imposes and estate or gift tax at the federal level as of June 30, 1979.
Austria (Domicile Treaty) Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Estates, Inheritances, Gifts and Generation-Skipping Transfers,
U.S.-Austria, June 21, 1982, T.I.A.S. 10570.
NOTE: Austria no longer imposes an inheritance tax or gift tax as of
Aug. 1, 2008.
Denmark (Domicile Treaty) Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Estates, Inheritances, Gifts and Certain Other Transfers, U.S.Den., Apr. 27, 1983, T.I.A.S. 11089.
Finland (Situs Treaty) Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Estates and Inheritances, U.S.-Fin., Mar. 3, 1952, T.I.A.S. 2595.
France (Domicile Treaty) Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Estates, Inheritances, and Gifts, U.S.-Fr., Nov. 24, 1978, T.I.A.S.
9812 (as modified by protocol signed Dec. 8, 2004).
Germany (Domicile Treaty) Convention for Double Taxation with
Respect to Taxes on Estates, Inheritances, and Gifts, U.S.-Ger., Dec.
3, 1980, T.I.A.S. 11082 (as modified by protocol signed Dec. 14, 1998).
Greece (Situs Treaty) Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Movable Property Estates of Deceased Persons, U.S.-Greece, Feb. 20,
1950, T.I.A.S. 2901 (as modified by protocol signed July 18, 1953, supplementary protocol signed Dec. 30, 1953, and protocol signed Feb. 12,
1964, T.I.A.S. 6375).
Ireland (Situs Treaty) Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Estates of Deceased Persons, U.S.-Ir., Sept. 13, 1949, T.I.A.S. 2355.

410

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:381

Italy (Situs Treaty) Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Estates
and Inheritances, U.S.-It., Mar. 30, 1955, T.I.A.S. 3678.
Japan (Situs Treaty) Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Estates, U.S.-Japan, Inheritances and Gifts, Apr. 16, 1954, T.I.A.S.
3175.
Netherlands (Domicile Treaty) Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Estates and Inheritances, U.S.-Neth., July 15, 1969, T.I.A.S.
7061.
Norway (terminated) (Situs Treaty) Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Estates and Inheritances, U.S.-Nor., June 13, 1949, T.I.A.S.
2358 (terminated, effective Jan. 1, 2015).
NOTE: The treaty was terminated, effective Jan. 1, 2015, due to Norway's 2014 repeal of its inheritance tax.
South Africa (Situs Treaty) Convention with Respect to Taxes on the
Estates of Deceased Persons, U.S.-S. Afr., Apr. 10, 1947 (as supplemented by Protocol signed July 14, 1950), T.I.A.S. 2509.
Sweden (terminated) (Domicile Treaty) Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Estates, Inheritance, and Gifts, U.S.-Swed., June
13, 1983, T.I.A.S. 10826 (terminated, effective Jan. 1, 2008).
NOTE: The treaty was terminated, effective, Jan. 1, 2008, due to Sweden's 2004 repeal of its inheritance and gift taxes.
Switzerland (Modified Situs Treaty) Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Estates and Inheritances,
U.S.-Switz., July 9, 1951, T.I.A.S. 2533.
NOTE: The U.S.-Switz. Treaty is a modified Situs Treaty insofar as
there is no express assignment of situs for taxation purposes.
United Kingdom (Domicile Treaty) Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Estates of Deceased Persons and on Gifts, U.S.-U.K., Oct.
19, 1978, T.I.A.S. 9580.
Convention Respecting Double Taxation and Taxes on Estates of Deceased Persons, U.S.-U.K., Apr. 16, 1945, T.I.A.S. 1547 (terminated,
Oct. 19, 1978).
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APPENDIX C: POST-1966 BILATERAL ESTATE TAX TREATIES
AMONG COUNTRIES WITH FIVE OR MORE*
Permanent
OECD
Model Establishment
Mentioned
Domicile
Treaty
Austria (repealed inheritance tax Aug. 2008)
1 France
1993
Y
Y
2 Hungary
1975
Y
Y
3 Liechtenstein 1955
4 Netherlands 2001
Y
Y
5 Sweden
1962
6 Switzerland
1974
Y
Y
7 U.S.
1982
Y
Y
Denmark
1 Finland
1989
Y
Y
2 Iceland
1989
Y
Y
3 Germany
1995
Y
Y
4 Italy
1966
Y
Y
5 Sweden
1989
Y
Y
6 Switzerland
1974
Y
No
7 U.S.
1983
Y
Y
Finland
1 France
1958
2 Netherlands 1954
3 US
1952
4 Denmark
1989
Y
Y
5 Iceland
1989
Y
Y
6 Sweden
1989
Y
Y
7 Switzerland
1956
France
1 Austria
1993
Y
Y
2 Belgium
1959
3 Finland
1958
4 Germany
2006
Y
Y
5 Italy
1990
Y
Y
6 Monaco
1950
7 Portugal
1994
No
No
8 Spain
1963
9 Sweden
1994
Y
Y
10 U.K.
1963
11 U.S.
1978
Y
Y
Germany
1 Denmark
1995
Y
Y
2 France
2006
Y
Y
3 Greece
1910
4 Switzerland
1978
Y
Y
5 U.S.
1980
Y
Y
Italy
1 Denmark
1966
Y
Y
2 France
1990
Y
Y
3 Greece
1964
4 Israel
1968
No
No
5 Sweden
1956
6 U.K.
1966
7 U.S.
1955

Year

Year

Permanent
OECD
Model Establishment
Domicile
Mentioned
Treaty

Netherlands
1 Austria
2001
Y
Y
2 Curaçao
2013
Y
Y
3 Finland
1954
4 Israel
1974
Y
Y
5 Sweden
1952
6 Switzerland 1951
7 U.K.
1979
Y
Y
8 U.S.
1969
Y
Y
Sweden (repealed inheritance tax Jan. 2008)
1 Austria
1962
2 Belgium
1956
3 Denmark
1989
Y
Y
4 Finland
1989
Y
Y
5 France
1994
Y
Y
6 Hungary
1936
7 Iceland
1989
Y
Y
8 Israel
1962
9 Italy
1956
10 Netherlands 1952
11 Norway
1989
Y
Y
12 South Africa 1961
13 Spain
1963
14 Switzerland 1979
Y
Y
15 U.K.
1980
Y
Y
16 U.S.*
1983
Y
Y
Switzerland
1 Austria
1974
Y
Y
2 Denmark
1974
Y
No
3 Finland
1956
4 Germany
1978
Y
Y
5 Netherlands 1951
6 Sweden
1979
Y
Y
7 U.K.
1993
Y
Y
8 U.S.
1951
U.K.
1 France
1963
2 India
1956
3 Ireland
1977
Y
No
4 Italy
1966
5 Netherlands 1979
Y
Y
6 Pakistan
1957
7 South Africa 1978
Y
Y
8 Sweden
1980
Y
Y
9 Switzerland 1993
Y
Y
10 U.S.
1978
Y
Y
*Terminated

